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Abstract-Opportunistic networking - forwarding messages 
in a disconnected mobile ad hoc network via any encountered 
nodes - otters a new mechanism for exploiting the 
mobile devices that many users already carry. Forwarding 
messages in such a network often involves the use of 
social network routing- sending messages via nodes in the 
sender or recipient's social network. Simple social network 
routing, however, may broadcast these social networks, which 
introduces privacy concerns. 
This paper introduces two methods for enhancing privacy 
in social network routing by obfuscating the social network 
graphs used to inform routing decisions. We evaluate these 
methods using two real-world datasets, and find that it is 
possible to obfuscate the social network information without 
leading to a significant decrease in routing performance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile devices, such as mobile phones, are commonly 
carried by people. While most current communication 
using such devices takes place through in frastructure 
such as licensed GSM or UMTS networks, it may be 
possible to exploit these devices in an ad hoc manner. 
By directly exchanging messages between devices when in 
physical proximity, an opportunistic network may thus be 
formed; messages are sent via intermediary devices, in a 
disconnected store-and-forward architecture. 
One main challenge in opportunistic networks is routing: 
given episodic connectivity based on people's real-world 
movements, how can we send messages from source to 
destination? One approach is epidemic routing - flooding 
the network with messages, by sending messages during 
each and every encounter [ 14]. This approach ensures that, 
if a path exists between source and destination, the message 
will be delivered along this path as quickly as possible. But 
sending large numbers of redundant messages is wasteful, 
and will rapidly drain the mobile devices' batteries. 
To reduce message delivery cost, messages should be 
selectively forwarded during encounters between members 
of the opportunistic network. What is a good method of 
determining whether a message should be forwarded? 
One approach is social network routing. Based on the 
assumption that encounters between mobile devices are more 
likely to occur between people in the same social network 
- i.e., between people who are connected to each other, 
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perhaps through friendship or co-location, than between 
random strangers - messages may be forwarded selectively 
only within the sender's social network. 
But one problem with social network routing is 
that of privacy. In social network routing schemes, 
intermediate nodes forward messages based on whether 
the encountered node is in the original sender's social 
network. Social network routing may involve broadcasting 
social network information in the clear (not encrypted end­
to-end because the information is used by intermediate 
nodes for routing), creating potential privacy concerns. For 
example, opportunistic network users might wish to hide 
an embarrassing friend. Or a user may accept the use of 
social network information for routing, but not the whole 
network being world-viewable; it is one thing for a curious 
person to be able to infer some of the social network 
based on forwarded messages, but another to broadcast the 
potentially-sensitive information. 
Our goal is to mitigate privacy concerns while retaining 
the advantages of social network routing. In this paper, we: 
• Analyse the potential privacy threats implicit in social 
network routing, to present an attack tree. 
• Investigate the effect on routing performance of 
obfuscating social network graphs. 
• Investigate hiding social network information using 
one-way hashing, via the Bloom filter data structure. 
Our contributions are to provide what is, to our 
knowledge, the first analysis of threats in social network 
routing, and the first schemes to attempt to enhance privacy 
in social network routing without key management. 
We discuss related work in the next section, and present 
a threat analysis in Section I I I. We discuss our two social 
network routing schemes in Section IV. Section V evaluates 
these schemes using two real-world traces, and finally in 
Section V I  we conclude and discuss ongoing work. 
I I. RELATED WORK 
Opportunistic networks [ 1 1] have become increasingly 
popular and relevant as more people carry mobile devices. 
Essentially, an opportunistic network is a disconnected 
MANET (mobile ad hoc network), where mobile nodes 
can send messages in the absence of any knowledge about 
network topology. Nodes opportunistically make use of any 
other nodes that they encounter, as long as these encountered 
nodes are likely to help the message reach its destination. 
The performance of an opportunistic network depends 
on accurately determining which encountered nodes will 
be useful in forwarding. Many forwarding schemes have 
been proposed that leverage the structure of nodes' social 
networks to do so [ 5], [ 9]; if we know that a node is in 
the same social network as a message's destination, then 
it may make sense to use that node for forwarding. In 
this paper, we refer to this class of opportunistic network 
forwarding protocols as social network routing, and the class 
of protocols which broadcast social network information in 
the clear as simple social network routing. 
If nodes are to trust their data with any other nodes that 
they encounter, privacy is paramount. Existing proposals for 
addressing privacy in opportunistic networks, e.g., [4], [ 13], 
use key management to divide network users into groups and 
restrict access accordingly. Key distribution and management 
in such schemes is very difficult in an ad hoc environment, 
however, and may impede the very feature which makes 
opportunistic networking so appealing - the fact that nodes 
may forward to any node that they encounter. Moreover, 
even within these systems, group members can observe the 
routing tables of all other members, so many of the attacks 
that we describe in this paper are still possible. 
Aad et al. [ 1] present methods to improve anonymity 
within an ad hoc network. These include using Bloom filters 
to compress and obscure a packet's routing list, and a 
technique for combining multicast and onion routing. They, 
however, assume global routing information is available for 
the network, which we do not; and they do not evaluate 
performance using simulations, as we do here. 
I I I. T HRE AT ANALYSIS 
Before we can enhance privacy in social network routing, 
we need to understand the threats against privacy that may 
occur when using such routing schemes. We choose to 
employ attack trees, as introduced by Schneier [ 12]. 
An attack tree is a type of and-or tree, used to enumerate 
attacks against a system. The root node of the tree is the 
overall attack goal, while nodes within the tree are subgoals. 
The children of a particular node are the steps required to 
achieve that node's subgoal. By constructing such a tree from 
the root node (overall goal) downwards, we may enumerate 
a structured threat analysis for attacks against a system. 
Following is a preliminary attack tree for privacy threats 
against users of opportunistic networks employing social 
network routing. Our attack tree may not be complete; future 
work is to further increase the rigour of our threat analysis. 
A. Goal: Discover structural information about the social 
network graph. 
1) Learn whether a friendship link exists (or does not 
exist) between two users. OR 
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a) Discover communication (or lack of) between the 
users. OR 
i) Eavesdrop a message as  i t  i s  forwarded user­
to-user, from source to final destination (or 
any intermediary). OR 
A) In  simple social network routing, a 
message traced along such a path reveals 
social network links (or lack of) -because 
messages are forwarded if and only 
friendship links exist. Friendship links are 
the path traversed by the message. 
ii) Extract source/destination from an 
intercepted message to an intermediary. 
b) Extract friendship links from an intercepted 
message to an intermediary. 
2) Learn how many friendship links a particular user has. 
a) Extract friendship links from an intercepted 
message to an intermediary. 
B. Goal: Discover whether two individuals have been in 
proximity within a certain timeframe. 
1) Follow one or both individuals for the time in question. 
OR 
2) Infer proximity by  sending a specially crafted 
message, and making inferences based on where the 
message is observed within the network. OR 
a) Example: has Alice from New York recently 
met Bob from Los Angeles? To find out, an 
attacker Mallory in New York can inject a 
message addressed for colluding attacker Trudy 
in Los Angeles into the system, with Alice and 
Bob only as requested intermediaries. If Trudy 
receives Mallory's message, Mallory and Trudy 
have learned that Alice and Bob have met within 
the lifetime of this malicious message. 
3) Infer proximity by noting that messages are not 
forwarded twice. OR 
a) Example: i f  a message is  not forwarded to  a 
node known to be a requested intermediary, 
the message must already have been forwarded 
earlier. An attacker can infer that the nodes were 
in proximity before this time. This is a passive 
version of 2. 
4) Wait in a common place and listen for message traffic. 
Message exchange, or message headers, may reveal 
the colocation of individuals to an attacker. 
C. Goal: De-anonymise a social network to discover the 
presence of individuals within the network. 
1) Follow individuals, and tie their network identifiers to 
their actual identities. OR 
2) Infer identities from known portions of the social 
network. 
a) Example: if five people are known to be mutual 
friends, and four are deanonymised with a fifth 
mysterious node, an attacker can infer that this 
unknown node is the last member of the clique. 
I V. PRIVACY-ENHANCED SOCIAL NETWORK ROUTING 
In simple social network routing schemes, the sender's 
social network is transmitted in the clear along with each 
message. Intermediate forwarding nodes are able to read the 
sender's full social network in plaintext, facilitating most of 
the threats outlined in Section ITI. 
Encrypting the social network information end-to-end can 
ensure privacy, but we would then lose the advantages 
of social network routing: intermediate forwarding nodes 
would no longer be able to exploit the sender's social 
network information to inform their routing decisions. 
Inspired by [2], we attempt to target the social network 
routing privacy threats by obfuscating a sender's social 
network. We now introduce two schemes for doing so. 
A. Statisticulated Social Network Routing 
Named for a portmanteau of statistical manipulation 1 , 
our first scheme is Statisticulated Social Network Routing 
(SSNR). For each message transmitted, the sender makes 
changes to the message's copy of their social network -
adding or removing nodes. While the social network sent 
along with the message will be based to some extent on the 
sender's true social network, and so still useful for social 
network routing, the social network has been modified by 
the addition or removal of nodes. Any node seeing the social 
network sent along with the message now cannot say with 
certainty whether a particular node is truly part of, or absent 
from, the sender's social network. 
In practice, the sender may choose the level of social 
network manipulation on a per-message basis. In our 
evaluation, however, we examine routing performance for 
a particular choice of modification degree of the sender's 
social network. For instance, a + 50% modification of the 
social network would meant that the sender adds 50% more 
nodes to their social network before message transmission. 
We thus determine average performance for a particular 
degree of social network modification. For simplicity, we 
do not evaluate routing performance while simultaneously 
adding and removing nodes. 
It would still be possible for a malicious person to average 
over the social network information included with many 
messages of one particular sender. But we have created 
much more work for this malicious person: many generated 
messages must be intercepted, rather than just one single 
message to reveal all. Since the nodes in the opportunistic 
network are mobile, and messages are only transmitted when 
1 Huff coins the tenn statisticulation in [8]: "Misinfonning people by the 
use of statistical material might be called statistical manipulation; in a word 
(though not a very good one), statisticulation." 
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nodes encounter one another, a malicious person would 
likely have to physically follow a node for some length of 
time before being able to intercept multiple messages from 
the same source; a task considerably more challenging than 
eavesdropping a single message. 
B. Obfuscated Social Network Routing 
Our second scheme, Obfuscated Social Network Routing 
(OSNR), embeds the social network information within a 
Bloom filter. A Bloom filter [3] is a data structure allowing 
probabilistic querying for set membership. False negatives 
are not possible, but false positives are - with increasing 
probability as the Bloom filter becomes more full. After 
inserting each node in the sender's social network into a 
Bloom filter, we may regard the Bloom filter as a non­
trivially-reversible hash of this social network information. 
To make a rainbow table attack2 impractical, we create 
a per-message random salt, which is sent along with the 
message in the clear. The elements inserted into the Bloom 
filter are a concatenation of this random salt with a unique 
node identifier (any unique identifier would suffice, such as 
MAC address, IMEI, or even some higher-level identifier 
tied to the user rather than the device). 
Given the Bloom filter, the random salt and an 
encountered node's identifier, it is easy to make a routing 
decision: query for set membership of the random salt 
concatenated with the node identifier. A positive result -
guaranteed if the node is inside the sender's social network, 
but possible with low probability if not - means to forward 
the message, since the node is most likely in the sender's 
social network. A negative result means that the node is not 
in the sender's social network, and so not to forward. 
Since we do not employ encryption (given the lack of a 
PKI), it is still perhaps possible for an attacker to reverse 
engineer the Bloom filter by brute force - the attacker can 
iterate through all the node identifiers, concatenating each 
with the plaintext salt and testing for a Bloom filter match. 
This is orders of magnitude more work than a rainbow table 
lookup, however, and must be repeated for every message. 
The Bloom filter (with salt) does not provide perfect security, 
but does make the attacker's job much harder. 
It is possible to combine OSNR and SSNR: the social 
network may be modified as in SSNR prior to hashing in 
a Bloom filter as in OSNR. We refer to this as SSNR-OSNR. 
We note that Bloom filters are fixed-width - a convenient 
property for scalability. In pure SSNR, packet headers may 
grow arbitrarily large as the sender's social network grows; 
this is potentially a problem for sender with very large social 
networks (and compounded if these networks grow further 
using SSNR). OSNR, and SSNR-OSNR, have no such scaling 
problem due to the fixed size of the Bloom filter. 
2 A rainbow table is a precomputed lookup table of hash value to input. 
V. EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
We now evaluate our two schemes to detennine their 
impact on opportunistic network performance. We use trace­
driven simulation with two real-world datasets. 
A. Datasets 
We collected the first dataset - which we call the SASSY 
dataset - in a previous experiment. 2 5  participants were 
equipped with 802. 1 5.4 Tmote Invent sensor motes and 
encounters were tracked for a period of 7 9  days, from which 
we selected a 30-day section for our simulations. 
The original dataset was very sparse due to hardware 
limitations which meant that many encounters were lost. 
Inspired by [7], we augment our traces using a working-day 
and augmented random-waypoint model. Nodes randomly 
select a waypoint from a set of points of interest and 
walk according to predetennined paths (such as roads) to 
reach these points. Nodes moved at 0. 5-1. 5ms-1• At each 
waypoint the nodes could stop for 0-120s. Each node was 
additionally randomly assigned a home location, and the 
nodes would travel to this location to "sleep" for 8 hours 
in every 24. Each node had an additional 10% chance of 
either choosing to go to the Computer Science departmental 
buildings (since our participants were mainly Computer 
Science students) or their "home" at any waypoint selection. 
The social network information for the SASSY dataset 
was self-reported by the 2 5  participants at the start of 
the experiment: their Facebook " friends". Many participants 
knew each other - the mean number of other participants 
in each p articipant's social network (i.e., Facebook friends) 
was 9.8, with a standard deviation of 5.0. 
The second dataset used was the well-known Reality 
Mining (RM) dataset collected at MIT [6]. This dataset 
comprises Bluetooth encounter traces from � 100 mobile 
phone users over the course of an academic year. To obtain 
social network information for this dataset, we use the 
participants' address book information - if a pair of nodes 
encounter one another, and at least one has the other in their 
address book, then each node is said to have the other in its 
social network. Unlike the SASSY dataset, few participants 
knew each other: 52 participants had at least two participants 
in their social network (and were thus candidate nodes for 
our simulations). Of these 52 participants, the mean size of 
the social network was 3.7, with a standard deviation of 2.0. 
As participants left the experiment throughout the year 
(and new participants joined), we could not treat the dataset 
as one contiguous trace. We thus select out 30-day segments. 
B. Simulation parameters 
We performed trace-driven simulations using these two 
datasets with the following parameters: simulation length of 
30 days; 30 messages generated per day; message TTL of 
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one day; at least 10 runs for each set of parameters; SSNR 
obfuscation from -80% to +200% at 20% intervals.3 
For the SASSY dataset, which contains location 
information, we used a customised version of the ONE 
simulator [ 10], which included our augmented random 
waypoint model, to generate ns-2 traces. For speed, we 
used ns-2 rather than ONE for all of the simulations. The 
RM dataset has no location information so we could not 
use ns-2; we instead parsed the Bluetooth encounters and 
simulated message-passing with a Python program. 
C. Performance metrics 
We evaluate our simulations using three metrics [ 9]: 
• Delivery ratio: proportion of delivered messages, out 
of the total number of unique messages created. 
• Delivery cost: total number of messages (including 
duplicates) transmitted, normalised by the total number 
of unique messages created. 
• Delivery delay: time taken for a message to reach its 
destination. 
D. OSNR implementation 
Our OSNR implementation used a 128-bit Bloom filter. To 
insert each element (node ID  concatenated with a random 
salt, as described in IV-B) into the filter, the element's 128-
bit M D 5  hash4 was divided into four 32-bit integers. Taking 
each integer mod 128 (the filter length) resulted in four 
values in range 0- 127, and the four corresponding bits in 
the Bloom filter were, if not already 1, set to 1. 
E. Results 
Figures 1-6 show our trace-driven simulation results for 
our routing schemes with the SASSY and RM datasets. For 
every set of parameters for our three metrics, applying 
OSNR did not significantly impact routing performance -
the error bars overlap for each datapoint. Any impact from 
Bloom filter false positives is so slight as to be insignificant. 
Figure 1 shows that for the SASSY dataset, delivery 
ratios are high for all tested social network size target 
modifications. It is possible to remove 60% of the sender's 
social network's nodes while still retaining a delivery ratio 
of over 90% of the ratio with an unmodified social network. 
Although much noisier, and with lower delivery ratios, 
Figure 5 shows a similar result for the RM dataset. Large 
modifications to the size of the sender's social network can 
be made without significantly affecting the delivery ratio. 
3If we reach the upper bound of all nodes added, or the lower bound of 
only one node remaining in the sender's social network, we stop adding or 
removing nodes for this message. 
4MD5 is not collision-resistant, but we use the uniformity and one­
way properties, not collision-resistance property, of MD5. A maliciously­
generated collision does not affect the security of our system, since senders 
generate Bloom filters on a per-message basis and the ability to generate 
a collision would merely mean another false positive in routing - which 
already may occur, and which can much more easily be produced by the 
malicious sender setting more Bloom filter bits to 1. 
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Figure 1. SASSY dataset. Delivery ratio vs target percentage modification of 
each message sender's social network. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. It is possible to remove over half of the social network links while 
still retaining high message delivery ratios. 98% of messages arrive with 
simple social network routing. 91 % of messages arrive even after removing 
60% of the source node's social network links. 
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Figure 2. SASSY dataset. Message delivery cost vs target percentage 
modification of the number of friends of each message's original sender. 
As we obfuscate the sender's social network by adding links, the delivery 
cost increases. 
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Figure 3. SASSY dataset. Message delivery delay vs target percentage 
modification of each message sender's social network. As we remove from 
the sender's social network, delivery delay increases - but only from about 
6 to 8 hours for simple social network routing compared to SSNR with 
-60% sender social network size target change. 
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Figure 4. RM dataset. Delivery ratio vs target percentage modification of 
each message sender's social network. It is possible to modify the sender's 
target social network size greatly (-80%, +200%) without significantly 
affecting delivery ratio. 
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Figure 5. RM dataset. Message delivery cost vs target percentage 
modification of each message sender's social network. As we obfuscate 
the sender's social network by adding links, the delivery cost increases. 
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Figure 6. RM dataset. Message delivery delay vs target percentage 
modification of each message sender's social network. The impact on 
delivery delay when modifying the sender's target social network size is 
insignificant. 
Figure 2 shows delivery cost for the SASSY dataset 
is significantly affected by modifying the sender's social 
network size: the smaller the social network, the lower 
the cost of sending a message. Compared to simple social 
network routing, with 50 data messages per unique message, 
a -60% change in sender social network results in only 
10 data messages: five times fewer. SSNR has improved 
delivery cost, yet simultaneously retained a good delivery 
ratio (Figure 1) and increased the sender's privacy by not 
revealing some of their true friends. 
Figure 5 shows that delivery cost for the RM dataset 
appears to show a similar trend as for the SASSY dataset, but 
again with more noise. The corresponding absolute figures 
for delivery cost, however, are lower than SASSY- perhaps 
because RM encounters are much sparser. 
Figure 3 shows that delivery delay for the SASSY dataset 
increases when removing nodes from the sender's social 
network. This increase is from �6 to �8 hours from simple 
social network routing to SSNR with removing 60% of the 
sender's social network. If delivery delay is a concern, we 
may indeed reduce the delay by adding nodes with SSNR. 
Figure 6, however, shows little correlation between 
delivery delay and the modification of the size of the sender's 
social network for the RM dataset: any difference that may 
exist seems to be lost in the noise from this dataset. 
Finally, we see that for both datasets we can significantly 
modify the sender's social network size (e.g., by -60%), 
thus increasing the privacy of the sender, and yet retain good 
routing performance. Removing nodes may significantly 
reduce delivery cost - a beneficial side effect - while 
enhancing privacy. Conversely, if delivery delay or ratio 
is paramount, SSNR allows adding nodes to improve 
performance by these metrics, again while enhancing 
privacy, though at the expense of increased delivery cost. 
V I. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have presented two schemes for 
enhancing privacy in social network routing in opportunistic 
networks. We find that it is possible to obfuscate a sender's 
social network by removing up to 60% of the nodes from 
the social network, while still maintaining a delivery ratio of 
90% of unaltered social network routing. We demonstrated 
that, by using Bloom filters, we can prevent eavesdropping 
of social network information with only a minimal effect 
on network performance. We evaluated these two schemes 
using two real-world datasets. Although the datasets vary 
widely (including in scale, location and connectivity), our 
findings appear to hold for both. 
We have presented only an initial evaluation of our routing 
schemes; our work is ongoing. We need to formally analyse 
whether the SSNR and OSNR schemes provide consistent 
deniability. We are exploring refined versions of these 
schemes, e.g., selecting popular or well-connected nodes to 
remove or add to a node's social network, although these 
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may introduce additional attacks. We are also exploring more 
of the attacks described in our threat analysis, and testing 
against our schemes in simulation. 
We note that the two datasets used to evaluate our routing 
schemes may not be representative of general opportunistic 
network usage. Both involve participants who opted in to 
small-scale experiments; their social networks and mobility 
patterns may differ from a universal deployment. We are 
searching for new datasets to use to evaluate our schemes. 
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